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Abstract 
 
Social impacts associated with new telecommunication innovations greatly affect both 
globalisation and territorial identities. Apparently contradictory trends bring with them 
elements of rapid social change and political uncertainty. This chapter reflects on the 
conjunction of both dimensions of the local and the global, and carries out a prescription of 
the progressive consolidation of a new cosmopolitan localism.  
A theoretical review of the concept of multiple identities precedes a subsequent discussion on 
the effects of globalisation, the extension of market values, and the relative loss of power by the 
nation states. Subsequently, the focus is set on the growing role played by the global meso-
communities. These can be small nation-states within regional supranational blocks, stateless 
minority nations, sub-state regions and large conurbations, and seem to be better equipped to 
maximise developments related to global action and local identities.  
References made to the European Union context seek to illustrate how the interaction of the 
processes of bottom-up transnationalisation and top-down devolution of powers have made 
possible a more effective access of civil society to multi-level decision-making. The new 
cosmopolitan localism translates into a growing adjustment between the particular and the 
general in the gradual development of Europeanisation.  
 
 
Paper presented at the Fifth IPSA Symposium, ‘Globalisation, Nations and Multi-level Governance: 
Strategies and Challenges’, International Political Science Association, Montréal 24-26 October, 2002. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Modernisation brought about the idea of all-embracing state national identities rooted 
in both cultural and civic axes. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, such 
identities are openly questioned and have become problematic. While being corroded 
by the forces of globalisation they are also subject to fragmentation, competition and 
overlapping elements of a multiple and diverse nature. Unquestionably, there is a 
noticeable strengthening of sub- and supra-state identities. The discontinuity and 
dislocation of social arrangements provide that different identities relate to each other 
in quite an unpredictable manner.  
 
As a matter of fact, citizens face a situation of advanced modernity with a degree of 
perplexity. They have discovered new horizons in the understanding of their own 
collective and individual life within a climate of uncertainty and rapid change. To a 
large extent, all these transformations have been accentuated by the 
telecommunications innovations.  
 
In plural societies individuals are tied to cultural reference groups that might be in 
competition among themselves. This results in a multiplicity of socio-political 
identities, dynamic and often shared, which not always are expressed explicitly. 
Therefore, identity markers are malleable and the intensity of their manifestation 
greatly depends upon contingent circumstances (Barth, 1969, Hobsbawm & Ranger, 
1983; Brass, 1991, Cohen, 1992,).  
 
For social scientists a considerable problem arises on establishing boundaries and 
degrees to citizens’ self-identification, and on interpreting those causes for 
politicisation and mobilisation related to territorial identities (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 
1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). In fact, identities are shared in various degrees by 
individuals as they are subject to constant internalisation by group members 
(Melucci, 1989; Giddens, 1991; Smith, 1991; Greenfeld, 1992).  
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The interaction between the local and the global, the revival of territorial identities, 
and the increasing incidence of the meso-level in contemporary life concentrate the 
primary interest of this chapter. The focus on territoriality should not be considered as 
the neglect of other forms of functional identity politics also affected by globalisation 
(class, gender or religion). However, in this chapter the main area of analysis 
concerns identity and territory, and the spatial context of reference is in most 
instances that of the European Union. 
 
In the first section, a theoretical review of the concept of multiple identities precedes 
a reflection on the implications of globalisation, the extension of market values, and 
the relative loss of power and influence by the nation-state. The third section focuses 
on the growing role played by the global meso-communities in the context of the 
European Union. This development seems to be in line with a trend towards what 
can be labelled as a new cosmopolitan localism, which seeks to make the general 
and the particular politically compatible. 
 
DUAL AND MULTIPLE IDENTITIES IN COMPOUND POLITIES 
 
The revival of ethnoterritorial identities has coincided with an increasing challenge to 
the centralist model of the unitary state. In plural polities,1 decentralisation, 
federalisation and subsidiarity seek to accommodate a response to the stimuli of the 
diversity or plurality of the polities involved. These comprise groups and countries 
with differences of language, history or traditions, which are often reflected in 
different party systems, channels of elites’ representation or interests’ articulation 
(Keating, 1998, 2001; Moreno, 1999; Safran & Maiz, 2000; Loughlin, 2001). 
 
There is a growing attachment of citizens to communities at local and meso-level. By 
meso-communities we refer to those sub-state polities situated in a somewhat 
equidistant position between the nation-state (be it unitary or multinational), 
                                             
1 We refer to this notion, of a more general natural, based upon the ancient Greek idea of politeia, 
understood as a legitimate constitutional political body. Let us remind that most modern nation-states 
were built during the period 1485-1789. According to Stein Rokkan, the second phase of nation-
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transnational regional bodies (APEC, EU, MERCOSUR, NAFTA), and other 
international frameworks (GATT, IMF, OECD, WB, WTO). Territorial identities 
associated with these communities have provided new political underpinnings for 
citizens and groups. Arguably, some ‘small’ nation-states, which are already 
integrated in transnational contexts of governance as the EU, and which have ‘lost’ 
substantial powers as former sovereign unitary states, could also be included in the 
meso-level category for the simplest reason of their size and their societal 
homogeneity (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Ireland, or Luxembourg)2 
 
Citizens in multinational and compound national states3 often incorporate in variable 
proportions, both sub-state/ethnoterritorial4 and state/national identities. The degree 
of internal consent and dissent in these plural polities has in the concept of dual 
identity or compound nationality a useful methodological tool for socio-political 
interpretations5. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
building, the subsequent processes of mass democratisation and the construction of welfare states 
completed the main four-stage political development in contemporary Europe (Flora et al., 1999). 
2 The ‘No’ result in the Danish Referendum to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992, as well as the 
‘Yes’ ratification of the same Treaty with opt-outs in a similar referendum held on May 1993, can be 
regarded as expressions of the uneasiness of this ‘small and homogeneous’ European state to accept 
the loss of traditional sovereign powers. The negative outcome of the Referendum on the Nice Treaty 
held in Ireland in June 2001, could also be interpreted, among other considerations, as a refusal 
towards fiscal harmonisation within the EU and fear about future majority voting by EU decision-
making institutions. However, the referendum held in October 2002 produced a clear pro-EU result. 
3 In 1991, Daniel Elazar concluded that nearly 40% of the world’s population lived in countries formally 
self-labelled as federations, while a further 33% were states that had adopted federal forms and 
practices. With the disappearance of the Soviet union and Yugoslavia such figures should be revised. 
However, Russia maintained its political organisation as a federation. Other countries, such as 
Belgium, Spain or South Africa, have joined both sub-categories as federations or federal-like 
countries. 
4 By ethnoterritorial we refer to an identity dimension where conflicts and political mobilisations are 
developed and have as their chief social actors those ethnic groups which possess a geographical 
underpinning. Such a spatial reference is identifiable within the boundaries of a polity, usually of a 
compound or plural composition (Moreno, 1986; Rudolph and Thompson, 1992). 
5 The example of Spain is illustrative. In all seventeen Spanish Comunidades Autónomas (sub-state 
regions and nationalities) there is a high proportion of citizens who claim some form of dual self-
identification. The question addressed to them in successive polls has been as follows: ‘In general, 
would you say that you feel...(1) ‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’; (2) ‘More Andalusian, 
Basque, Catalan, etc. than Spanish’; (3) ‘As much Andalusian, Basque, Catalan as Spanish’; (4) ‘More 
Spanish than Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’; or (5) ‘Only Spanish’. In the period October 1990-
June 1995 a degree of duality was expressed by around 70 per cent of the total Spanish population 
(i.e. categories 2, 3 and 4). Approximately 30 per cent of all Spaniards expressed a single identity 
(‘Only Spanish’, or ‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’) (Moreno, 2001a). For an analysis of the 
case of Catalonia see Moreno, Arriba and Serrano (1998). In the case of Scotland/United Kingdom, 
surveys using a similar scale were first carried out in the mid-1980s (Moreno, 1986: 439-441).  
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Dual identity citizens within multinational states share their institutional loyalties at 
both levels of political legitimacy with no apparent fracture between them. The task of 
identifying and measuring the notion of dual identity is far from simple. The changing 
nature implicit in such a duality greatly complicates matters. Thus, positive 
perceptions about the intervention of the national state by individuals in sub-state 
stateless nations or regions can result in a loosening of their self-ascribed local 
identities with a corresponding reinforcement of their sense of membership within the 
national state, and vice versa. Changes of degree in one or the other components of 
the dual identity are produced according to subjective perceptions, often collectively 
shaped. In fact the reinforcement of one identity upon the other may well result in the 
complete disappearance of such the compound nationality. Arguably, this could have 
been the case for some groups living in countries subject to processes of de-
colonisation, ethnic cleansing, or sectarian political violence (e.g. Commonwealth 
dominions, ex-Yugoslavia, or Northern Ireland). 
 
The existence of this compound nationality in some European countries has had an 
institutional correlation in the setting-up of regional legislatures and governments 
(e.g. Spain’s Comunidades Autónomas or UK’s devolved administrations). These 
processes of decentralisation of power have not only preserved meso-level identities 
but have also projected the political aspirations of these sub-state communities, 
which have given priority to cultural, educational, linguistic, and media policies. The 
role of these self-governing institutions in the production and re-production of, for 
example, Basque, Catalan, Scottish or Welsh identities has been very important 
(Giner, 1984; Moreno, 1995; Keating, 1996; Guibernau, 1999; Martínez-Herrera, 
2002). 
 
But supra-national levels of ascription can also integrate both state and sub-state 
identities in apparent conflict among themselves. The question remains on whether 
two or more identities (state national and sub-state), which could be subsumed in 
one referred to a larger entity (e.g. European), would overcome their possible 
relationship of incompatibility between them: what could be in a multi-level EU the 
result of an interplay between exclusive forms of self-identification such as, for 
example, Basque-Spanish, Corsican-French, Flemish-Belgian, Padanian-Italian, or 
Scottish-British? The response cannot be simply dismissed as a political oxymoron. 
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In the context of state political arenas, the quest for self-government and home-rule by 
regions and meso-level communities is in full accordance with the variable 
manifestation of such duality in citizens’ self-identification: the more the primordial 
ethnoterritorial identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the demands for 
political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterised the state national identity is, the 
less likely it would be for ethnoterritorial conflicts to appear. At the extreme, complete 
absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to a socio-political 
fracture in the pluriethnic state, and demands for self-government would probably take 
the form of secessionist independence. In other words, when citizens in a sub-state 
community identify themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional outcome of 
such antagonism will also tend to be exclusive. 
 
Contemporary liberal thinkers have greatly revitalised the debate regarding individual 
rights and collective identities.6 Many of them can be labelled as ‘liberal nationalists’ 
(Tamir, 1993; Miller, 1995). Some have argued persuasively for the case of 
multiculturalism and the politics of recognition for minorities (Taylor, 1992; Kymlicka, 
1995; Walzer, 1997). However, some of their normative analyses insist upon the 
‘improbability’ of accommodating distinct societies and ethnoterritorial groups within 
multinational polities. National and state developments of Québec and Canada can 
provide analytical cases to reflect upon the moral foundations of asymmetrical territorial 
accommodation (Gagnon, 2001).  
 
In the context of a transnational institutional aggregation, as the EU, identity politics and 
territorial claims face the complex challenge of being accommodated within a multi-
tiered framework of governance. In this respect, Europeanisation implies a confluence 
of resources and outputs and comprises countries sharing a somewhat common 
                                             
6 Already in the 1960s, Glazer and Moynihan (1963) questioned the very nature of the assimilationist 
melting pot in the USA. In their study on the city of New York, they concluded that prejudice and 
discrimination among descendants of Afro-Americans, Jewish, Irish, Italians, or Puerto-Ricans were 
more noticeable than their common features as American citizens. Later on the assimilationist ‘melting 
pot’ was proposed to be a pluralist ‘salad bowl’. 
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historical development and embracing values of democracy and human rights of an 
egalitarian nature.7 
 
If it is certain that we witness a growing attachment to supranational levels of civic 
membership and institutional development, this process goes hand in hand with a 
strengthening of meso-level identities. As a result, citizens in advanced industrial 
democracies seem to conciliate supranational, state and local identities, which 
majority and minority nationalisms often tend to polarise in a conflictive manner. The 
emphasis on territorial identities and polities showing a significant degree of internal 
diversity ought not to be placed merely on distinctiveness, but also on those 
relationships of interaction and congruence.  
 
Arguably, some authors are of the opinion that political accommodation to secure 
institutional stability in plural societies or polyarchies is almost impossible, and is bound 
to result in either the break-up of the polity or the consolidation of a type of hegemonic 
authoritarianism for the maintenance of the state’s unity (Dahl, 1971; Horowitz, 1985). 
This chapter sustains the view that co-operation and agreement may not only 
overcome conflicts and divergence within plural polities, but can also provide a 
deepening of democracy by means of favouring the participation of citizens at all 
possible levels of institutional life and political decision-making. Such developments 
usually fit better in multinational polities where internal ethnoterritorial and cultural 
diversity are politicised, and territorial accommodation is made possible by 
decentralised structures of government.8 
 
GLOBALIZATION, MARKET VALUES AND THE NATION-STATE 
 
At a time when certain universal visions of human existence seemed to indicate a 
fusion of both individuality and globality, group affinities have returned to the fore as 
                                             
7 However, the concept is far from being precise and clear-cut. It is multi-semantic and subject to 
various degrees of understandings and interpretations. Europeanisation is not a static concept, but a 
rather dynamic idea to found expression in the gradual development of common institutions in Europe 
(e.g. Agreement of Schengen, Court of Justice, Euro currency). 
8 For Juan Linz federalism and federal-like arrangements can consolidate liberal democracy in 
multinational polities (1997). For an analysis of the process of decentralisation and federalisation in 
the case of Spain, see Moreno (2001a, 2002). 
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main protagonists of social life. Other alternative views have envisaged a process of 
transit to a post-modern relativism. All things considered, citizens around the world 
revive old particularities and communal roots. In this way spatial references multiply 
so that their social existence can be legitimised through a re-assertion of collective 
identities.  
 
Cultural myths and group affiliations continue to offer a substratum for the 
management of individual anxieties and aspirations. European societies, in particular, 
seem to reinforce secular ties of integration within the family,9 or to recreate medium-
sized political communities as was the case in the early Modern Age.10 
 
However, divergent effects resulting from the gradual configuration of the global 
village advanced by Marshall McLuhan can be observed. In the first place, the 
globalisation and internationalisation of trade encouraged by the telecommunication 
innovations are decisively affecting the economy world-wide, and have brought about 
a deep restructuring of contemporary capitalism. Other related developments have 
led some authors to point out that we are witnessing the emergence of a net society 
characterised by the exchange of transactions of an informational nature (Castells, 
1997).  
 
Nowadays, individuals and groups have immediate access to a wide range of 
endless data, information, and news generated in the remotest corners in the earth. 
The integrated networks of personal computers, TV terminals, and Web servers allow 
for a reciprocal and fluid communication between the house or workplace and the 
multifaceted external world.11 One consequence of these technological developments 
                                             
9 This is the case of South European countries. In Spain, for instance, three quarters of secondary 
education students consider the family to be the principal source of socialisation and a locus where 
“...all important things in life are said to be orientations towards future life” (CIS, 1996). In Italy, 93% of 
the respondents in a national survey expressed their trust in the family as compared to 20% who 
declared to count on the state (La Repubblica, 29.Nov.02) 
10 As said above, this is particularly relevant concerning major conurbations, regions, stateless 
nations, and small nation-states. Within the context of the British Isles such typologies can be 
illustrated with reference to Greater London, the North East of England, Scotland, and the Republic of 
Ireland, respectively. 
11 Immanuel Wallerstein, pioneer in putting forward the world-system approach that emphasises a 
global rather that a state-centric perspective (1974), already underlined the growing importance of 
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is a higher degree of democratisation in the processes of dissemination and 
exchange of information.  
 
A myriad of facts, including those related to cultures and collectives all over the world 
are now available to the general public. The ‘digestion’ of such avalanches of 
information increasingly conditions economic, political, and social activities. The 
restriction of information and representation images characteristic of power practices 
in the past has been progressively replaced by the efficient management of 
overwhelming masses of information produced swiftly and without restraint.  
 
The drive towards rebuilding relationships between the in- and out-spheres of human 
existence is shaped by citizens’ internalisation of practicalities and values related to a 
global context affecting matters of everyday life. Market values of an individualistic 
and self-interest nature seem to have permeated citizens’ attitudes and perceptions 
worldwide.12 Identities are in the midst of such a process of re-definition, with crucial 
derivations for political culture, social mobilisation, and political institutions.  
 
As things considered, the most important factor in all aspects of globalisation can be 
considered as perceptive (Strange, 1995). Interpretations claiming that a blurring of 
local markers would follow the globalising trends should nevertheless be qualified.  
 
Indeed, national economic policies are becoming more and more dependent on 
external factors and constraints beyond their control (Camilleri & Falk, 1992; Schmidt, 
1995). But geographical mobility does not solely affect capital flows. Other production 
factors are also concerned, such as industrial components and parts manufactured in 
cheap-labour countries and imported subsequently for assembling, marketing, and 
                                                                                                                                          
households as ‘part and parcel’ of the world economy, as a basic units of production (Wallerstein, 
1984).  
12 This statement should be qualified regarding popular sentiments held in some European countries 
where globalisation is felt as a flood of ideas representing an increasing alien lifestyle imported from 
North America. Often happens that globalisation and the universalisation of the North-American 
experience of de-regulation are made synonymous concepts (Fligstein, 1998). 
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sale in core industrial countries. International freight and a legion of stateless 
managers are other factors that are becoming increasingly transnational.13 
 
Financial globalisation has meant a transfer of authority and power from the nation-
states to the markets. The very patterns of economic competition are to comply with 
the new rules of global markets and the strategies of transnational corporations. 
Some authors are of the opinion that global capitalism is deprived of any sense of 
territoriality. On selecting locations for investment, analysts consider first and 
foremost the level of profit that they expect to achieve. Indeed, they have a much 
wider perspective than that determined by purely national interests.14 But there are 
other crucial elements related to levels of social cohesion, the absence of political 
turmoil, or the stability of the institutions of the candidate countries which also need 
to be assessed. Other cultural aspects, such as educational systems or national 
languages are important too. Furthermore, the processes of decision-making for 
investments are greatly exposed to the input made by the media and opinion leaders, 
neither of which can be considered territorially ‘neutral’. 
 
National governments still maintain their nominal sovereignty empowering them to 
negotiate new economic frameworks. At the same time they also bargain with the 
transnational corporations. However, their economic manoeuvring to put forward 
innovative polices outside global demands is becoming rather limited. Failure of the 
programs for indicative planning implemented by the first Mitterrand Government in 
the early 1980s illustrated the ‘persuasiveness’ of the external constraints posed on 
the national sovereignty in the most statistic country in Europe.15 
                                             
13 Boeing, for instance, decided to drop its labelling as an ‘American corporation’. Note that many of 
the components for their planes are produced in a dozen different countries outside the USA. 
However, other companies take advantage of being a multinational consortium, as is the case of 
Airbus, the commercial arch-rival of Boeing. 
14 William Greider (1997) holds the view that capital movements only take into account the potential 
level of profits disregarding geographical criteria. In any case, the recent economic crises in Japan 
and South East Asia seem to corroborate the axiom that the international financial markets are 
unstable by nature.  
15 French Governments after the Second World War put into action plans for economic growth. These 
were to be implemented in a hierarchical manner by the powerful French public sector, and were 
‘indicative’ of the industrial priorities to be taken by private businesses. The model worked 
satisfactorily in the post-war period allowing the French economy to perform at a good level. Right 
after the Socialist victory in the 1981 General Election, the Mauroy Government attempted a different 
path away from the policies of economic austerity followed by the neighbouring European countries. 
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Together with the limits posed upon nation-states’ sovereignty by the 
internationalisation of the financial markets, the regions and large cities have also 
exerted pressure on central governments for decentralisation and autonomy. Both 
actions are having great repercussions on the traditional powers of nation states. 
Increasingly, sub-state mesogovernments and local authorities do not require the 
rationalising intervention of central bureaucracies and elites. In fact, the rules of the 
New World Order, Inc. often concern the action and policies of these sub-state layers 
of governments. They can activate policies of industrial relocation or attraction of 
foreign capitals without the role of intermediaries at the state’s centre. By means of 
local incentives, urban re-development plans, or favouring corporatist agreements 
with trade unions and industrialists, mesogovernments and metropolitan authorities 
can have direct negotiations with the transnational corporations involved. 
 
As a matter of fact, meso-governments do not restrict their action to the domestic 
arenas. They tend to project themselves as international actors and regard 
paradiplomacy as an important activity for the promotion of their interests. Territorial 
politics in advanced industrialised societies are undergoing a fundamental change 
with respect to their relationship with the ‘external’. International processes, 
globalisation and the construction of continental regimes are becoming elements 
central to the study of regionalism and stateless nationalism (Lecours & Moreno, 
2003). 
 
EUROPEANISATION, SUBSIDIARITY AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
Against this background of internationalisation, the role played by medium-size 
polities is acquiring relevance in most aspects of contemporary life. The renewal of 
community life at the meso-level derives mainly from the combination of two main 
factors: a growing rejection of state centralisation coupled with a strengthening of 
supranational politics, and a reinforcement of local identities and societal cultures 
with a territorial underpinning.  
                                                                                                                                          
Not long after their initial implementation French economic policies suffered a Copernican turn and 
were to align themselves with the course of action taken by the rest of the central European 
economies.  
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Mesogovernments are no longer dependent on nation-building programmes of the 
like carried out during the XIX and XX centuries. Their own entrepreneurs, social 
leaders and local intelligentsia have adopted many of the initiatives and roles once 
reserved for the ‘enlightened’ elites, who in the past held the reins of power at the 
centre of their nation states. Positions of influence are now more evenly distributed in 
central, meso-level and local institutions. Furthermore, the co-option of regional elites 
to the central institutions of government is no longer the exclusive route available to 
‘successful’ political careers. 
 
The supranational framework provided by the European process of convergence 
brings with it a ‘new’ element of further cosmopolitanism to meso-communities and 
local institutions. At one point, and in the face of hard economic competition from 
other world regions, the very idea of a ‘fortress Europe’ was proposed by some 
analysts. According to this view, the secession from the international world arena 
would preserve the maintenance of the European welfare regimes. An economic 
‘wall’ around EU member states would guarantee the social rights achieved by 
generations of Europeans. It would also stimulate a balanced growth, which, in turn, 
would create new employment coupled with job-sharing and the reduction of working 
time. Immigration would be tightly regulated. Undoubtedly the implementation of this 
‘virtuous circle’ would mean a U-turn in the cosmopolitan approach of the European 
culture and a de-naturalising change in its value-system. Besides, the current level of 
Europeanisation would render the establishment of a strategy for achieving a 
monolithic autarchy unfeasible. The very idea of a ‘fortress Europe’ cannot be 
embraced as a workable scheme, despite pressures produced by an increasing 
xenophobia in reaction to an intensification of illegal immigration. The common 
European matrix for human rights of an egalitarian nature should prevent such a 
development.16 
 
                                             
16 Some authors are of the opinion that an ever-latent possibility of rivalries between nation states is 
always potentially explosive (Chomsky, 1994). 
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However, efforts of Europeanisation in order to build up a macro community of trusts, 
which would dismantle internal boundaries,17 need to be reoriented towards 
transferring more responsibilities to the meso-layer of government. Among others, 
two factors can be identified as having greatly contributed to enhance the 
significance of sub-state communities: (a) The re-assertion of territorial identities, and 
(b) The implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. Let us briefly review both 
elements: 
 
 (a) The reinforcement of local identities has provided civil societies with a 
more participative and active role. Examples in Western Europe do not circumscribe 
to electoral deviations from national patterns (CiU-Catalonia, CSU-Baviera, Lega-
Northern Italy, SNP-Scotland). Social movements and industrialists of the ‘new 
economy’ have found a more flexible context for action at the regional level. Central 
state apparatuses are often clumsy and inefficient in dealing with bottom-up 
initiatives. Medium-size nation states (Denmark or Finland), stateless nations 
(Catalonia or Scotland), regions (Brussels or Veneto) and metropolitan areas 
(London or Berlin)18 are well equipped for carrying out innovation policies in a more 
integrated Europe. In particular, the quest of medium-size communities to run their 
own affairs and to develop their potentialities outside the dirigiste control of central 
state institutions is a generalised trend throughout the European Union. 
 
Many signs seem to point towards the rise of a European type of communitarianism, 
which should be regarded in quite a distinct fashion from that prescribed in North 
America for local communities (Etzioni, 1993). In the case of the USA, many of the 
communitarian experiences may be regarded as reactions to specific social 
cleavages and pressing social fractures (the criminalisation of social life), as 
                                             
17 Along the lines of Stein Rokkan’s ‘macro-model of European political development’, the 
accommodation of cleavage structures forged in centuries of history appeared to be a pre-requisite to 
any political attempt to dismantle internal boundaries in a supra-national Europe (Flora et al, 1999). 
18 Other conurbations, such as those of Madrid and Paris are also re-creating local civic cultures 
alongside their cosmopolitan traditions. Despite the lack of single identities or ethnic uniformities, large 
conurbations are in a similar position to that of the meso-communities as regards running their own 
affairs, and in many cases hey attempt to develop their potentialities outside the dirigiste control of the 
central state institutions. A different issue is the location of central bureaucracies (or ‘Eurocracies’, as 
is the case of Brussels) in their territories. Likewise, some of the officials of the central institutions 
cannot refrain from having a traditional perception that capital cities are the very representation of the 
nation-state. 
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instrumental means of socialisation in response to urban constriction (suburban 
isolationism), or as alternative lifestyles to dominant values (possessive 
individualism). In this respect, North-American communitarianism can be seen mainly 
as socially defensive.19  
 
In the EU, territorial identities are mainly pro-active. They are not mere mechanisms 
of response for controlling the informational avalanche generated by the 
telecommunications revolution. The reinforcement of sub-state territorial identities is 
deeply associated with powerful material and symbolic referents of the past (culture, 
history, territories). But they seem to have engaged in a process of innovation 
departing from a common ground and seeking to overcome the de-naturalising 
effects of global hypermodernity.20 However, their manifestations do not take refuge 
in a reactive parochialism. They emerge, therefore, as ‘project identities’ 
characterised in many instances by pro-active attitudes.21 
 
 (b) The principle of subsidiarity was enshrined in the Treaty of European Union 
of 1992, known as the Treaty of Maastricht. It provides for decisions to be taken 
transnationally only if local, regional or national levels cannot perform better. In other 
words, the preferred locus for decision-making is that closer to the citizen, and as 
local as possible. State political elites, reluctant to further the process of European 
institutionalisation, interpreted the subsidiarity principle as a safeguard for the 
preservation of traditional national sovereignty and, consequently, the powers to 
intervene centrally.  
 
Up until recent years, the case of the United Kingdom was paradigmatic concerning 
the refusal by the state-centred elites to implement downwards the rational of 
                                             
19 Other functional identities linked to various dimensions of social life, such as cultural forms, gender, 
religion and individual sociobiological conditions can also be interpreted as new forms of ‘resistance’ 
(Kilminster, 1997). 
20 De-naturalising is used here to mean the deprivation of the rights of citizenship within an established 
democratic polity. 
21 According to Manuel Castells (1997) ‘project identities’ do not seem to originate from the old 
identities of the civil societies in the Industrial Age, but from the development of current ‘resistance 
identities’ against the informational avalanche. This argument is rather circular as regards its territorial 
dimension. In the case of the USA sub-state spatial identities are not commensurable with the type of  
collective identities deeply rooted in the volkgeist of the diverse European peoples.  
 15
European subsidiarity. According to such interpretations, defended by Thatcherism, 
the legislative supremacy of Westminster should be preserved from supranational 
intervention and regulation originated at the ‘federal’ institutions of the European 
Union. However, the devolution of power from the centre of the British state to the 
constituent nations of the UK, and to amalgamated local authorities like the Greater 
Council of London, could not be denied taking into account the same argumentative 
grounds. The process of devolution of powers, which has developed in the UK since 
the arrival of New Labour to power in 1997, can be regarded as the implementation 
of the subsidiarity rationale tout-court.22 The dilemma remains as regards the role to 
be played by the English regions in the future governance of the UK within the EU. 
 
Subsidiarity favours the participation of sub-state layer of governments in the running 
of public affairs, although global ones are also included. At the same time, it is to 
encourage intergovernmental co-operation on the assumption that the role of the 
national states would be less hierarchical than it has been up until now. Territorial 
identities would be intertwined in a manner that would express the degrees of 
citizens’ loyalties towards the various sources of political legitimisation: municipalities, 
regions, nations, states, and European Union. Accountability and territorial 
institutions would consequently reflect the political expression of people’s identities 
and democratic participation.  
 
Immigration from non-EU countries has certainly had an impact on the growing 
feelings of xenophobia in Europe. Nevertheless, immigrants who are willing to take 
on those values of civic pluralism and tolerance find no major difficulty of integration 
in the economic and social life at their first ‘port of entry’, i.e. local and meso-
communities. 
 
CONCLUSION: A NEW COSMOPOLITAN LOCALISM 
 
The processes of bottom-up transnationalisation and top-down devolution of powers 
have allowed a considerable extension of a type of European cosmopolitan localism. 
                                             
22 Of special relevance is the issue of state welfare nationalism, developed as national-building policy 
after the Second World War, and the quest for further autonomy in the area of social policies claimed 
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This is reflected in both societal interests, which are aimed at developing a sense of 
local community and at participating simultaneously in the international context. 
There is, thus, a growing adjustment between the particular and the general. 
 
European cosmopolitan localism mainly concerns medium-sized polities, within or 
without the framework of a state. In the ‘Old Continent’ it can be detected in small 
nation-states (Denmark, Eire, Luxembourg), stateless minority nations (Catalonia, 
Flanders, Scotland), but also in regions (Brussels, Languedoc, Veneto) and 
conurbations (Berlin, London, Madrid). The latter, in particular, seem to follow a 
pattern of re-creating those political communities which flourished in the age prior to 
the New World discoveries (Italian city-states, Hanseatic League, principalities). 
However, and in contrast with the Renaissance period, there is now a common 
institutional tie inherent in the process of Europeanisation. The majority of the EU 
peoples have internalised European institutions, albeit rather loosely and gradually. 
The European Court of Justice and the Schengen Agreement can be regarded as 
steps advancing firmly towards the very idea of European transnationalisation.  
 
Democratic accountability and the full involvement of citizens were given priority by 
Prodi’s European Commission in a fully-fledged statement at the beginning of the 
millennium (Commission, 2000). The ways and means by which territorial subsidiarity 
and democratic accountability are envisaged in the future European governance 
concerns the decentralisation of day-to-day programmes and tasks. The difficulties of 
implementing transnational policies from Brussels, particularly in the area of 
traditional national sovereignty such as social welfare,23 were implicitly acknowledged 
in such a statement. Further to this, the agreement taken at the 2000 Nice summit in 
order to work out a EU treaty in 2004 based upon a new intergovernmental balance 
of powers seems to give support to the quest for more extensive decentralisation.  
 
Europeanisation should be regarded as a process of multi-level governance 
incorporating existing cultural systems and collective identities of both national and 
                                                                                                                                          
by devolved parliaments, as is the case of Scotland (McEwen, 2002). 
23 This area of social policy-making is highly shaped by local cultures and life styles, and is less likely 
to be dealt with in a homogeneous and decentralised manner from a supra-national entity (Moreno, 
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sub-national levels. In this way, it would avoid to be realized as an exogenous 
process, which is superimposed on the internal interaction of communities with long-
standing cultures and history.∗∗  
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